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ABSTRACT 
The objective of informing and educaiing the public about risk 
issues seems easy to attain in principle, but, in practice, may be 
difficult to accomplish. This paper attempts to illustrate why this is 
so. To be effective, risk communicators must recognize and overcome a 
number of obstacles that have their roots in the limitations of 
scientific risk assessment and the idiosyncracies of the human mind. 
Doing an adequate job of communicating means finding comprehensible ways 
of presenting complex technical material that is clouded by uncertainty 
and inherently difficult to understand. The problems may not be 
insurmountable, however, if designers of risk information programs are 
sensitive to the difficulties. 
Key words: risk communication, risk perception, risk management, risk 
information 
Risk Analysis, in press. 
To effectively manage ••• risk, we must seek new 
ways to involve the public in the decision-making process 
••• They [ the public l nee.d to become involved early, and 
they need to be informed if their partipation is to be 
meaningful." 
(William Ruckelshaus, 1983, p. 1028) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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In a bold and insightful speech before the National Academy of 
Sciences at the beginning of his second term as EPA administrator, 
William Ruckelshaus called for a government-wide process for managing 
risks that thoroughly involved the public. Arguing that government must 
accommodate the will of the people he quoted Thomas Jefferson's famous 
dictum to the effect that, 
"If we think ( the people) not enlightened enough to 
exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the 
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their 
discretion." 
Midway into his tenure as EPA administrator, Ruckelshaus' 
experiences in attempting to implement Jefferson's philosophy led him to 
a more sober evaluation: 
"Easy for him to say. As we have seen, informing 
discretion about risk has itself a high risk of failure" 
(Ruckelshaus, 1984, p. 160). 
This paper attempts to illustrate why the goal of informing the 
public about risk issues, which seems easy to attain in principle, is 
surprisingly difficult ~o accomplish. To be effective, risk 
communicators must recognize and overcome a number of obstacles that 
have their roots in the limitations of scientific risk assessment and 
the idiosyncrasies of the human mind. Doing an adequate job of 
communicating means finding comprehensible ways of presenting complex 
technical material that is clouded by uncertainty and inherently 
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difficult to understand. Awareness of the difficulties should enhance 
the chances of designing successful informational--programs. 
2. LIMITATIONS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment is a complex discipline, not fully understood by its 
practitioners, much less the lay public. At the technical level, there 
is still much debate over terminology and techniques. Technical 
limitations and disagreements among experts inevitably affect 
communication in the adversarial climate that surrounds many risk 
issues. Risk communicators must be fully aware of the strengths and 
limits of the methods used to generate the information they are 
attempting to convey to the public. In particular, communicators need 
to understand that risk assessments are constructed from theoretical 
models which are based on assumptions and subjective judgments. If 
these assumptions and judgments are deficient, the resulting assessments 
may be quite inaccurate. 
Nowhere are these problems more evident than in the assessment of 
chronic health effects due to low-level exposures to toxic chemicals and 
radiation. The typical assessment uses studies of animals exposed 
(relatively briefly) to extremely high doses of the substance to draw 
inferences about the risks to humans exposed to very low doses 
(sometimes over long periods of time). The models designed to 
extrapolate the results from animals to humans and from high doses to 
low doses are controversial. For example, some critics have argued that 
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mice may be from 3 x 10 . to 10 times more cancer prone than humans 
(Gori, 1980). Different models for extrapolating from high-dose 
exposures to low doses produce estimated cancer rates that can differ by 
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factors of 1000 or more at the expected levels of human exposures (which 
themselves are often subject to a great deal of uncertainty). 
Difficulties in estimating synergistic effects (interactions between two 
or more substances, such as occur between cigaret~e smoking and exp9sure 
to asbestos) and effects on particularly sensitive people (e.g. 
child[en, pregnant women, the elderly) further compound the problems of 
risk assessment. In light of these various uncertainties, one expert 
concluded that "Discouraging as it may seem, it is not plausible that 
animal carcinogenesis experiments can be improved to the point where 
quantitative generalizations about human risk can be drawn from them" 
(Gori, 1980; p. 259). 
In the adversarial climate of risk discussions, these limitations of 
assessment are brought forth to discredit quantitative risk estimates. 
To be credible and trustworthy, a communicator must know enough to 
acknowledge valid criticisms and to discern whether the available risk 
estimates are valid enough to have value for helping the public gain 
perspective on the dangers they face and the decisions that must be 
made. On the positive side, there are some hazards (e.g., radiation, 
asbestos) whose risks are relatively well understood. Moreover, for 
many other hazards, risk estimates are based on a chain of conservative 
decisions at each choice point in the analysis (e.g. studying the most 
sensitive species, using the extrapolation model that produces the 
highest risk estimate, giving benign tumors the same weight as malignant 
ones, etc). Despite the uncertainties, one may have great confidence 
that the "true risk" is unlikely to exceed the estimate resulting from 
such a conservative process. In other words, uncertainty and 
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subjectivity do not imply chaos. Communicators must know when this 
point is-relevant and how t-0 make it when it applies. 
Parallel problems exist in engineering risk assessments designed to 
estimate the probability and·-severity of rare, high-consequence 
accidents in complex systems such as nuclear reactors or LNG plants. 
The risk estimates are devised from theoretical models (in this case 
fault-trees or event trees) that attempt to depict all possible accident 
sequences and their (judged) probabilities. Limitations in the quality 
or comprehensiveness of the analysis, the quality of the judged risks 
for individual sequences, or improper rules for combining estimates, can 
seriously compromise the validity of the assessment. 
3. LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING 
Just as they must understand the strengths and limitations of risk 
assessment, communicators must appreciate the wisdom and folly in public 
attitudes and perceptions. Among the important research findings and 
conclusions are the following: 
3.1. People's perceptions of risk are often inaccurate 
Risk judgments are infl~enced by the memorability of past events and 
the imaginability of future events. As a result, any factor that makes 
a hazard unusually memorable or imaginable, such as a recent disaster, 
heavy media coverage, or a vivid film, could seriously distort 
perceptions of risk. In particular, studies. by Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs (1978), Morgan et al. (in press), and others 
have found that risks from dramatic or sensational causes of death, such 
as accidents, homicides, cancer, and natural disasters, tend to be 
greatly overestimated. Risks from undramatic causes such as asthma, 
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emphysema, and diabetes, which take one life at a time and are common in 
non-fat-a.1 form, tend to be underestimated. News media coverage of 
hazards has been found to be biased in much the same direction, thus 
contributing to the difficulties of obtaining a proper perspective on 
risks (Combs & Slovic, 1978). 
3.2. Risk information may frighten and frustrate the public 
The fact that perceptions of risk are often inaccurate points to the 
need for warnings and educational programs. However, to the extent that 
misperceptions are due to reliance on imaginability as a cue for 
riskiness, such programs may run into trouble. Merely mentioning 
possible adverse consequences (no matter how rare) of some product or 
activity could enhance their perceived likelihood and make them appear 
more frightening. Anecdotal observation of attempts to inform people 
about recombinant DNA hazards supports this hypothesis (Rosenburg, 1978) 
as does a controlled study by Morgan et al. (1985). In the latter study 
people's judgments of the risks from high voltage transmission lines 
were assessed before and after they read a brief and rather neutral 
description of findings from studies of possible health effects due to 
such lines. The results clearly .indicated a shift toward greater 
concern in three separate groups of subjects exposed to the description. 
Whereas mere mention and refutation of potential risks raises concerns, 
the use of conservative assumptions and "worst case scenarios" in risk 
assessment creates extreme negative reactions in people because of the 
difficulty of appreciating the improbability of such extreme but 
imaginable consequences. The possibility that imaginability may blur 
the distinction between what is (remotely) possible and what is probable 
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obviously poses a serious obstacle to risk information programs. 
Other psychological research shows that people may have great 
difficulty making decisions about gambles when they are forced to 
resolve conflicts generated by the possibility of experiencing both 
gains and losses, and uncertain ones at that (Slovic 1982; Slavic & 
Lichtenstein, 1983). As a result, wherever possible, people attempt to 
reduce the anxiety generated in the face of uncertainty by denying that 
uncertainty, thus making the risk seem either so small that it can 
safely be ignored or so large that it clearly should be avoided. They 
rebel against being given statements of probability, rather than fact; 
they want to know exactly what will happen. 
Given a choice, people would rather not have to confront the gambles 
inherent in life's dangerous activities. T~ey would prefer being told 
that risks are managed by competent professionals and are thus so small 
that one need not worry about them. However, if such assurances cannot 
be given, they will want to be informed of the risks, even though doing 
so might make them feel anxious and conflicted (Alfidi 1971; Fischhoff'-
1983; Weinstein 1979). 
3.3. Strong beliefs are hard to modify 
It would be comforting to believe that polarized positions would 
respond to informational and educational programs. Unfortunately, 
psychological research demonstrates that people's beliefs change slowly 
and are extraordinarily persistent in the face of contrary evidence 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Once formed, initial impressions tend to 
structure the way that subsequent evidence is interpreted. New evidence 
appears reliable and informative if it is consistent with one's initial 
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belief; contrary evidence is dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or 
unrepresentative. 
3.4. Naive views are easily manipulated by presentation format 
When people lack strong prior opinions, the opposite situation 
exists--they are at the mercy of the way that the information is 
presented. Subtle changes in the way that risks are expressed can have 
a major impact on perceptions and decisions. One dramatic recent 
example of this comes from a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and Tversky 
(1982), who asked people to imagine that they had lung cancer and had to 
choose between two therapies, surgery or radiation. The two therapies 
were described in some detail. Then, some subjects were presented with 
the cumulative probabilities of surviving for varying lengths of time 
after the treatment. Other subjects received the same cumulative 
probabilities framed in terms of dying rather than surviving (e.g., 
instead of being told that 68% of those having surgery will have 
survived after one year, they were told that 32% will have died). 
Framing the statistics in terms of dying dropped the percentage of 
subjects choosing radiation therapy over surgery from 44% to 18%. The 
effect was as strong for physicians as for laypersons. 
Numerous other examples of "framing effects" have been demonstrated 
by Tversky & Kahneman (1981) and Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 
(1982). The fact that subtle differences in how risks are presented can 
have such marked effects suggests that those responsible for information 
programs have considerable ability to manipulate perceptions and 
behavior. This possibility raises ethical problems that must be 
addressed by any responsible risk-information program. 
4. PLACING RISKS IN PERSPECTIVE 
4.1. Choosing risk measures 
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When we know enough to be able to describe risks quantitatively, we 
face a wide choice of options regarding the specific measures and 
statistics used to describe the magnitude of risk. Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney (1981) point out that choosing a 
risk measure involves several steps: (a) defining the hazard category; 
(b) deciding what consequences to measure (or report); and (c) 
determining the unit of observation. The way the hazard category is 
defined can have a major effect on risk statistics. 
Crouch and Wilson (1982) provide some specific examples of how 
different measures of the same risk can sometimes give quite different 
impressions. For example~ they show that accidental deaths per million 
tons of coal mined in the U. S. have decreased steadily over time. In 
this respect, the industry is getting safer. However, they also show 
that the rate of accidental deaths per 1,000 coal mine employees has 
increased. Neither measure is the "right" measure of mining risk. They 
each tell part of the same story. 
The problem of selecting measures is made even more complicated by 
the framing effects described earlier. Thus not only do different 
measures of the same hazard give different impressions, the~ 
measures, differing only in (presumably) inconsequential ways, can lead 
to vastly different perceptions. 
Sharlin's case study of the communication of information about the 
risks of the pesticide, ethylene dibromide (EDB), points to an important 
distinction between macro and micro measures of risk (Sharlin, 1985). 
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The Environmental Protection Agency, which was responsible for 
regulating EDB, broadcast information about the-aggregate risk of this 
pesticide to the exposed population. While the media accurately 
transmitted this macro analysis, newspaper editor·ials and public 
reaction clearly indicated an inability to translate this into a micro 
perspective on the risk to the exposed individual. In other words, the 
newspaper reader or TV viewer had trouble inferring an answer to the 
question, "Can I eat the bread?" from the aggregate risk analysis. 
4.2. Basic statistical presentations 
In this section, we shall describe a few of the statistical displays 
most often used to educate people about general and specific risks. We 
don't mean to endorse these presentations as optimal. They simply 
represent the favored formats of statisticians and risk assessors. 1 To 
date, there has been little systematic effort to develop and test 
methods for maximizing clarity and understanding of quantitative risk 
estimates. As a result, we know of no "magic displays" that guarantee 
understanding and appreciation of the described risks at the "micro 
level." 
1 We make no attempt to defend the validity of the statistics presented 
in this section. We take them directly from various published studies. 
Earlier in this section we pointed out the problems that one must be 
aware of when using and interpreting risk data. 
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Among the few "principles" in this field that seem to be useful is 
the assertion that comparisons are more meaningful than absolute numbers 
or probabilities, especially when these absolute values are quite small. 
Sowby ( 1965) argued that to ·aecide whether or not we are responding 
adequately to radiation risks we need to compare them to "some of the 
other risks of life" and Rothschild (1979) observed "There is no point 
in getting into a panic about the risks of lif~ until you have compared 
the risks which worry you with those that don't, but perhaps should." 
Familiarity with annual mortality risks for the population as a 
whole or as a function of age may provide one standard for evaluating 
specific risks. Sowby (1965) took advantage of such data to observe 
that one hour riding a motorcycle was as risky as one hour of being 75 
years old. Table 1 provides annual mortality rates from a wide variety 
of causes. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Mortality rates fail to capture the fact that some hazards (e.g. 
pregnancy, motorcycle accidents) cause death at a much earlier age than 
others (e.g. lung cancer due to smoking). One way to provide 
perspective on this consideration is to calculate the average loss of 
life expectancy due to the exposure to the hazard, based on the 
distribution of deaths as a function of age. Some estimates of loss of 
life expectancy from various causes are shown in Table 2. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
Yet- another innovative way to gain perspective was devised by Wilson 
(1979), who displayed a set of activities (Tabie 3), each of which was 
estimated to increase one's chance of death (during any year) by one in 
a million. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Comparisons within lists of risks such as those in Tables 1, 2, and 
3 have been advocated not just to gain some perspective on risks but as 
guides to decision making. Thus Cohen and Lee (1979) argued that "to 
some approximation, the ordering (in Table 2) should be society's order 
of priorities" and Wilson (1979) claimed that the comparisons in Table 3 
" ••• help me evaluate risk and I imagine that they may help others to 
do so, as well. But the most important use of these comparisons must be 
to help the decisions we make, as a nation, to improve our health and 
reduce our accident rate." However, Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 
(1980a), argued that such claims could not be logically defended. 
Although carefully prepared lists of risk statistics can provide some 
degree of insight, they provide only a small part of the information 
needed for decision making. As a minimum, inputs to decision making 
should include a detailed account of the costs and benefits of the 
available options, as well as an indication of the uncertainty in these 
assessments. As we have seen, uncertainties in risk estimates are often 
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quite large. Failure to indicate uncertainty not only deprives the 
recipient of information needed for decision making, it spawns distrust 
and rejection of the analysis. 
Some hazards, such as radiation, are present in nature and in many 
commonplace activities. For these hazards, comparisons of "non-natural" 
exposures (e.g., medical x-rays) with the natural or "everyday" 
exposures may prove instructive. 
5. BEYOND NUMBERS: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON RISK PERCEPTION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
A stranger in a foreign land would hardly expect to communicate 
effectively with the natives without knowing something about their 
language and culture. Yet risk assessors and risk managers have often 
tried to communicate with the public under the assumption that they and 
the public share a common conceptual and cultural heritage in the domain 
of risk. That assumption is false and has led to failures of 
communication and rancorous conflicts. 
5.1 The psychometric paradigm 
Evidence against the "commonality assumption" comes from 
sociological, psychological and anthropological studies directed at 
understanding the determinants of people's risk perceptions and 
behaviors. In psychology, research within what has been called the 
"psychometric paradigm" has explored the ability of psychophysical 
scaling methods and multivariate analysis to produce meaningful 
representations of risk attitudes and perceptions (see, for example, 
Brown & Green, 1980; Gardner et al., 1982; Green, 1980; Green & Brown, 
1980; Johnson & Tversky, in press; Lindell & Earle, 1982; Macgill, 1982; 
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Renn, 1981; Slavic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980b, 1984; Vlek & 
Stallen, 1981; von Winterfeldt et al., 1981). 
Researchers employing the psychometric paradigm have typically asked 
people to judge the current riskiness (or safety) of diverse sets of 
hazardous activities, substances, and technologies, and to indicate 
their desires for risk reduction and regulation of these hazards. These 
global judgments have then been related to judgements about the hazard's 
st.atus on various qualitative characteristics of risk, some of which are 
shown in Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Among the generalizations that have been drawn from the results of 
the early studies in this area are the following: 
(1) Perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. Psychometric 
techniques seem well suited for identifying similarities and differences 
among groups with regard to risk perceptions and attitudes. 
(2) "Risk" means different things to different people. When experts 
judge risk, their responses correlate highly with technical estimates of 
annual fatalities. Laypeople can assess annual fatalities if they are 
asked to (and produce estimates somewhat like the technical estimates). 
However, their judgments of risk are sensitive to other characteristics 
as well and, as a result, often differ markedly from experts' 
assessments of risk. In particular, perception of risk is greater for 
hazards whose adverse effects are uncontrollable, dread, catastrophic, 
fatal rather than injurious, not offset by compensating benefits, and 
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delayed in time so the risks are borne by future generations. 
A useful concept that has emerged from this Yesearch is the notion 
that the societal cost of an accident or mishap is determined to an 
important degree by what it signifies or portends (Slovic, Lichtenstein 
& Fischhoff, 1984). The informativeness or "signal potential" of a 
mishap, and thus its potential social impact, appears to be 
systematically related to the characteristics of the risk. An accident 
' that takes many lives may produce relatively little social disturbance 
(beyond that caused the victims' families and friends) if it occurs as 
part of a familiar and well understood system (e.g. a train wreck). 
However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as 
poorly understood), such as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA 
laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a 
harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps. 2 
5.2. Other paradigms 
Other important contributions to our current understanding of risk 
perception hav~ come from geographers, sociologists, and 
anthropologists. The geographical research focused originally on 
2 The concept of accidents as signals was eloquently expressed in an 
editorial addressing the tragic accident at Bhopal, India: "What truly 
grips us in these accounts [of disaster] is not so much the numbers as 
the spectacle of suddenly vanishing competence, of men utterly routed by 
techno~ogy, of fail-safe systems failing with a logic as inexorable as 
it was'once--indeed, right up until that very moment--unforeseeable. 
And the spectacle haunts us because it seems to carry allegorical 
import, like the whispery omen of a hovering future" (The New Yorker; 
February 18, 1985). 
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understanding human behavior in the face of natural hazards, but it has 
since broadened to include technological hazards as well (Burton, Kates 
& White, 1978). The sociological work (Moatti, Stemmeling, & Fagnani, 
1984; Mazur, 1984) and the anthropological studies (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982) have shown that the perceptions of risk that have been identified 
within the psychometric paradigm may have their roots in social and 
cultural factors. Mazur argues that, in some instances, response to 
hazards is caused by social influences transmitted by friends, family, 
fellow workers and respected public officals. In these cases, risk 
perception may form afterwards, as part of one's post hoc rationale for 
his or her behavior. In a similar vein, Douglas and Wildavsky assert 
that people, acting within social organizations, downplay certain risks 
and emphasize others as a means of maintaining the viability of the 
organization. 
5.3. Implications for risk communication 
Risk perception research has a number of direct implications for 
communication efforts. Psychometric studies imply that comparative 
examination of risk statistics, such as those in Tables, 1, 2, and 3 will 
not, by themselves, be adequate guides to personal or public decision 
policies. Risk perceptions and risk-taking behaviors appear to be 
determined not only by accident probabilities, annual mortality rates or 
mean losses of life expectancy, but also by numerous other 
characteristics of hazards such as uncertainty, controllability, 
catastrophic potential, equity and threat to future.generations. Within 
the perceptual space defined by these and other characterstics, each 
hazard is unique. To many persons, statements such as "the annual risk 
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from living near a nuclear power plant is equivalent to the risk of 
riding -an extra three mile.s in an automobile" appear ludicrous because 
they fail to give adequate consideration to the important differences in 
the nature of the risks from these two technologies. 
Psychometric research indicates that attempts to characterize, 
compare, and regulate risks must be sensitive to the broader conception 
of risk that underlies people's concerns. Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope 
(1984) have made a start in this direction by demonstrating how one 
might go about constructing a more adequate definition of risk. They 
advocated characterizing risk by a vector of measures (e.g. mortality, 
morbidity, concern due to perceived uncertainty, concern due to dread, 
etc.). 
The concept of accidents as signals indicates that, when informed 
about a particular hazard, people's concerns will generalize beyond the 
immediate problem to other related hazards. For example, with regard to 
the EDB scare, one newspaper editor wrote: 
"The cumulative effect--the 'body burden count' as scientists call 
it--is especially worrisome considering the number of other pesticides 
and carcinogens humans are exposed to." 
(The Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, Honolulu, Feb. 5, 1984) 
On the same topic, another editor wrote: 
"Let's hope there are no cousins of EDB waiting to ambush us in the 
months ahead." 
(San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 10, 1984) 
As a result of this broad (and legitimate) perspective, 
commmunications from risk managers pertaining to the risk and control of 
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a single hazard, no matter how carefully presented, may fail to 
alleviate people's fears, frustrations, and anger. If people trust the 
ability of the risk manager to handle the broader risk problems, these 
general-concerns will probably not surface. 
Whereas the psychometric research implies that risk debates are not 
merely about risk statistics, the sociological and anthropological work 
implies that some of these debates may not even be about risk. Risk may 
be a rationale for actions taken on other grounds or it may be a 
surrogate for social or ideological concerns. When this is the case, 
communicatJon about risk is simply irrelevant to the discussion. Hidden 
agendas need to be brought to the surface for open discussi?n, if 
possible (Edwards & von Winterfeldt, 1984). 
Perhaps the most important message from the research done to date, 
is that there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and 
perceptions. Laypeople sometimes lack certain basic information about 
hazards. However,·theirbasic conceptualization of risk is much richer 
than that of the experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are 
typically omitted from expert risk assessments. As a result, risk 
communication efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured as 
a two-way process (Renn, 1984). Each side, expert and public, has 
something valid to contribute. Each side must respect the insights and 
intelligence of the other. 
6. THE ROLE OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN INFORMING PEOPLE ABOUT RISK 
6.1. Critics of the media 
The mass media exert a powerful influence on people's perceptions of 
the world, the world of risk being no exception. Each morning's paper 
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and each evening's TV newscast seems to include a report on some new 
danger to our food, water, air, or physical safety. It is not 
surprising, given the actual and perceived influence of the media and 
the stakes involved in risk issues, that media coverage of risk has been 
subjected to intense scrutiny and harsh criticism. Content analysis of 
media reporting for specific hazards (DNA research, nuclear power, 
cancer) and the domain of hazards in general (e.g. diseases, causes of 
death) has documented a great deal of misinformation and distortion 
(Burger, 1984; Freimuth, Greenberg, DeWitt & Romano, 1984; Combs & 
Slavic, 1979; Kristiansen, 1983), causing critics such as Cirino (1971) 
to assert: 
"No one can be free from the effects of bias that exist in the mass 
media. . . Decisions based ,on distorted views of the world resulting 
from [such] ••• bias have resulted in tragically mistaken prior~ties, 
death and suffering" (p. 31). 
More than a few observers have blamed the media for what they see as 
public over-reaction to risk. Among the most vehement is physicist 
Bernard Cohen who argued that: 
"Journalists have grossly misinformed the American public about the 
dangers of radiation and of nuclear power with their highly unbalanced 
treatments and their incorrect or misleading interpretations of 
scientific information. 
"This misinformation is costing .our nation thousands of unnecessary 
deaths and wasting billions of dollars each year" (Cohen, 1983; p. 73). 
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6.2. In defense of the media 
A balanced examination of media performance needs to consider the--
difficulties faced by the media in reporting risk stories. Journalists 
operate under many constraints, including tight deadlines, the pressure 
of competition to be first with a story, and limitations on space or 
time (for TV reports). But the major difficulty stems from the inherent 
complexity of risk stories as outlined in the section of this report 
dealing with the limitations of risk assessment. Because of the 
technical complexity of the subject matter, journalists must depend on 
expert sources. But a risk story may involve such diverse problems that 
the journalist might need to interview specialists in toxicology, 
epidemiology, economics, hydrology, meteorology, emergency evacuation, 
etc., not to mention a wide variety of local, state, and federal 
officials. Even then, there is no assurance of completeness. No one 
may know what all the pieces are or recognize the limits of their own 
understanding (Fischhoff, 1985a). Few journalists have the scientific 
background to sort through and make sense of the welter of complex and 
often contradictory material that results from such a search. 
6.3. Improving media performance 
Despite the difficulties, there seem to be a number of actions that 
might help the media improve its performance in communicating risk 
information. Some of these actions are professional, others involve 
research. At the professional level, the following steps may be useful. 
Acknowledge the problem. The first step in addressing any 
deficiency is to recognize it as an important problem. We now know an 
understanding of risk is central to decisions that are of great 
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consequence to individuals and to society, that risk and uncertainty are 
inherently difficult to communicate, and that the media are a dominant 
source of risk information. The combination of these factors highlights 
the role of the media as a problem worthy of explicit, sustained 
attention, in high level meetings between journalists, scientists, and 
risk managers. 
Enhance science writing. Reporters obviously need to be educated in 
the importance and subtleties of risk stories. Fischhoff (1985) 
suggests a number of checklists and protocols that a reporter might use 
as a guide to understanding and clarifying risk issues. One of these,. 
titled "Questions·to Ask of Risk Analysis," is shown in Table 5. There 
should be scholarships to induce students and young journalists to 
pursue science writing as a profession, accompanied by awards and prizes 
to recognize and reward good science journalism when it occurs. 
· Insert Table 5 about here 
Develop science news clearinghouses. Science journalists need 
iaccess to knowledgable and cooperative scientists. A few organizations, 
such as the Scientists' Institute for Public Information have performed 
an important service along this line and some professional societies, 
such as the American Psychological Association, maintain offices that 
provide journalists with the names of scientists knowledgable about 
specific topics. More needs to be done to help journalists get reliable 
information about risk topics. 
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7. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Although much progress has been made toward-understanding risk 
attitudes, perceptions and behaviors, we still lack definitive 
understanding of many important issues relevant to risk communication. 
Some recommended research directions are described in this section. 
7.1. Informed Consent 
The right of citizens, patients, and workers to be informed about 
the hazards to which they are exposed from their daily activities, their 
medical treatments, and their jobs, provides the motivation behind much 
of the efforts to communicate information about risks. Within the 
context of any information program, research is needed to determine what 
people know and what they want to know about the risks they face and how 
best to convey that information. Moreover, there is need for a deeper 
understanding of the concept of consent (Maclean, 1982) as well as for a 
theory of informed consent that sets out criteria for evaluating the 
adequacy of information presentations. Fischhoff (1983; 1985b) has made 
a start in the latter direction by characterizing the problem of 
informed consent as a decision problem. In this view, the goal of 
informed consent is to enable the individual to make decisions that are 
in his or her best interests. Fischhoff points out that there are both 
cognitive and institutional barriers to achieving informed consent. 
Research is needed to understand these barriers and overcome them. 
To facilitate the process of informed consent, we need better ways 
to convey quantitative risk information. There is widespread agreement 
that casting individual risks in terms such as 10-x per year is not 
helpful to people. We need creative new indices and analogies to help 
-------·~·"--
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individuals translate risk estimates varying over .. many orders of 
magnitude into simple, int~itively meaningful terms. The task will not 
be easy. Ideas th~t appear, at first glance, to be useful, offen turn 
out, upon testing,, to make the problera worse. For example, an attempt 
to convey the smallness of 1 part of toxic substance per billion by 
drawing an analogy with a crouton in a five ton salad seems likely to 
enhance one's misperception of the contamination by making it more 
easily imaginable. The proposal to express very low probabilities in 
terms of the conjunction of two or more unlikely events (e.g. 
simultaneously being hit by lightning and struck by a meteorite) also 
seems unwise in,light of experimental data showing that people greatly 
overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events. Perhaps we can 
learn, by studying people's understanding of commonly used measures such 
as distance, time and speed, whether and how their understanding of 
quantitative risk can be improved. 
The sensitivity of risk communications to framing effects points to 
another avenue for research. We need a better understanding of the 
magnitude and generality of these effects. Are people's perceptions 
really as malleable as early results suggest? If so, how should the 
communicator cope with this problem? One suggestion is to present 
information in multiple formats--but does this help or confuse the 
recipient? Finally, the possibility that there is no neutral way to 
present information, coupled with the possibility that people's 
preferences are very easily manipulated, has important ethical and 
political implications that need to be examined. 
Because of the complexity of risk communications and the subtlety of 
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human response to them, it is extremely difficult, a priori, to know 
whether a particular message will adequately inform its recipients. 
Testing of the message provides needed insight into its impacts. In 
light of the known ,difficulties of communicating risk information, it 
could be argued that an informer who puts forth a message without 
testing its comprehensibility is guilty of negligence. This asiertion 
raises a host of research questions. How does one test a message? How 
does the communicator judge when a message in good enough in light of 
the possibility that not all test subjects will interpret it correctly? 
Can testing be used against the communicator by providing evidence that 
not everyone understood the message? 
Risk is brewed from an equal dose of two ingredients--probabilities 
and consequences. But most of the attention pertaining to informed 
consent seems to focus on the probabilities. It is assumed that once 
the potential consequence is named--lung cancer, leukemia, 
pneumoconiosis--one need say little else about it. We believe that 
neglecting to.educate people about consequences is a serious shortcoming 
in risk information programs. For example, an adequate discussion of 
risk cannot assume that people have good knowledge of what it's like to 
experience a certain disease, the pains, the discomforts, the treatments 
and their.effects, etc. This sort of information might best come from 
those who are the victims of such diseases. Research is needed to 
determine how best to deepen perspectives about the novel, unfamiliar 
consequences associated with the outcomes of illnesses, accidents, and 
their treatments. 
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7. 2. Information relevance. What lessons do peop.\.r:d,raw a,bout th~ir .. 
own vulnerability to a hazard on the ,basis o{il:isk ii:lfotmatidt1? ., 
example: 
t What do residents living near the Union Carbide pesticjd,,plant 
at Institute, West Virginia infer about their personal risk as a result 
:l , ' 
of the Bhopal accident? 
• What do7{ a heterosexual individual infer about personal 
vulnerability to AIDS from statistics based on homosexuals? 
I What does a resident of the West Coast infer >about/f.ifs·0 or hel. 
risk from. cancer due to polluted groundwater upon receiving.ris~.h 
t,;/J,,',\'?/f 
estimates for residents of the East Coast? 
Obviously, the personal message one draws 
\ 
depend upon the perceived relevance of that message--but the 
determinants of relevance are by no means understood. There are always· ... 
differences between the time and place and population (or species) from 
which risk information is derived and the time, place, and popuiation 
with which the recipient indentifies. When are these differences 
magnified into barriers justifying denial of relevance (ttthose 
Statistics don It really pertain tO me") and When are the barrier'$ made• 
permeable and the message assimilated? Such questions are fundamental 
to the process of risk communication, yet we know virtually nothing 
about them. 
7.3. Cognitive Representations of Perceived Risk 
People~s cognitive representations of risk dictate the sorts of 
information they will find necessary for participating in 
risk-management decisions. Thus, if characteristics of risk influence 
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perceptions and behaviors,-we will need to provide people with 
information about how well a hazard is known to science, the extent of 
its catastrophic potential, and other important considerations. If 
people examine accident reports for their signal value, then methods are 
needed to assess this factor and communications techniques are needed to 
express it meaningfully. However, we still lack a full understanding of 
the ways in which people characterize risk. Research is needed to 
provide a clearer picture of the multiple ways to represent perceptions 
and the variations of these representations across different individuals 
and groups (Harding & Eiser, 1984; Kuyper & Vlek, 1984; Kraus, 1985). 
The multivariate characterizations that have emerged from 
psychometric studies demonstrates that there are many things to be 
considered when thinking about risk and many (possibly incommensurable) 
factors to bear in mind when assessing the riskiness of different 
hazards. The need for some convenient general summary measure of risk 
seems apparent. Reliance on multiattribute utility theory to construct 
such an index (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984) provides one approach, 
but research is needed to determine if people can provide the explicit 
judgments needed to create such an index. Given an index, can people 
absorb the information it summarizes in a way that is meaningful and 
will they make or accept decisions based on it? Would they feel more 
comfortable being shown, in matrix or vector form, the component 
information it summarizes? 
7.4. Risk and the media 
We need a theoretical· framework to understand and improve the 
media's role in communicating risk. Some theorists, such as Gans (1980) 
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have proposed that one major role of journalism is to report events that 
threaten or violate important values--such as preserving a stable social 
order. In this light, things that "go awry," and thereby threaten 
natural, technological, social or moral disorder, become prime news 
topics. The relation between hazard characteristics and news coverage 
should be examined to discern more precisely how the media interpret 
their responsibility to warn society. 
One possibility is that coverage of risk incidents is systematically 
related to threat potential or signal value. If so, such coverage (as 
measured by frequency, size, and prominence of reports) should be 
related to the same characteristics that predict other risk perceptions 
and attitudes. Thus, incidents involving hazards perceived as unknown, 
dread, and potentially catastrophic would be expected to receive much 
greater coverage than incidents involving hazards with other 
characteristics. Data reported by Kristiansen (1983) provides some 
support for these notions. Her study of seven British daily newspapers 
found that threats with high signal value such as infectious diseases, 
food poisoning, and rabies, were disproportionately reported relative to 
their frequency of occurrence. 
Content analyses of media reports need to be supplemented by more 
controlled studies. An intriguing example of a controlled study was 
done by Johnson and Tversky (1983) who asked subjects to judge the 
perceived frequency of death from various causes after reading a single 
newspaper-style story about a tragi~ incident involving the death of a 
young man. The cause of death was either leukemia, homicide or fire, 
depending on the story. They expected to find that a story would 
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increase perceived frequency most for the specific hazard involved in 
the story, with somewhat smaller increases for similar hazards. 
Instead, the results indicated large increases in perceived frequencies 
for all hazards, with size of increase being unrelated to similarity. 
They hypothesized that the stories aroused negative affect which had a 
general influence on perception. This hypothesis is an important one, 
in need of further study, because it implies that media coverage might 
influence our perceptions of threat in subtle and pervasive ways. 
Other topics that could be studied by means of controlled news 
simulations are the reporting (or deletion) of uncertainties in risk 
estimates and the treatment given expert disagreements. How, for 
example, would journalists report a story in which 20 experts argued one 
way and one argued another? Would it matter if the ratio were higher or 
lower or if the dissenter had more or less prestigious credentials? 
Would experienced journalists or their editors treat the story 
differently than inexperienced reporters? Would the type of medium (TV, 
radio, print) make a difference? In sum, studies like these could point 
out biases or inadequacies in reporting about which journalists need to 
be informed. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Some observers, cognizant of the communication difficulties 
described above, have concluded that they are insurmountable. This 
seems an unreasonably pessimistic view. Upon closer examination, it 
appears that people understand some things quite well, although their 
path to knowledge may be quite different from that of the technical 
experts. In situations where misunderstanding is rampant, people's 
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errors can often be traced to biased experiences, which education may be 
able to counter. In some cases, people's stron~ fears and resistance to 
experts' reassurances can be traced to their sensitivity to the 
potential for catastrophic accidents, to their perception of expert-
disagreement about the probability and magnitude of such accidents, and 
to their knowledge of serious mistakes made by experts in the past and 
to their sensitivity to many qualitative concerns not included in 
technical risk analyses. Even here, given an atmosphere of trust in 
which both experts and lay persons recognize that each group has 
something to contribute to the discussion, exchange of information and 
deepening of perspectives may well be possible. 
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Table l 
ANNUAL FATALITY RATES PER 100,000 PERSONS AT RISK 
MoTORCYLING 
ALL AGES 
AERIAL ACROBATICS (PL.ANES) 
SMOKING {ALL CAUSES) 
SPORT PARACHUTING 
SMOKING (CANCER) 
FIRE FIGHTING 
HANG GLIDING 
COAL KINING 
FARKING 
MoTOR VEHICLES 
POLICE WORK (NON-CLERICAL} 
BOATING 
RODEO PERFORMER 
HUNTING 
ftRES 
1 DIET DRINKfDAY (SACCHARIN) 
4 Tss. PEANUT BUTTER/DAY (AFLATOXIN) 
FLOODS 
LIGHTNING 
METEORITE 
2000 
1000 
500 
300 
200 
120 
80 
80 
63 
36 
24 
22 
5 
3 
3 
2.8 
1.0 
0.8 
0.06 
0.05 
0.000006 
Source: Adapted fro,a Crouch & Wilson (1982). 
Table 2 
ESTIMATED LOSS OF LIFE EXPECTANCY DUE TO VARIOUS CAUSES 
CAUSE DAYS 
CIGARETTE SMOKING (HALE) 2,250 
HEART DISEASE 2,100 
BEING 30% OVERWEIGHT. 1,300 
BEING A COAL HINER l,100 
CANCER 980 
STROKE 520 
AMY IN VIETNAM qoo 
DANGEROUS JOBS, ACCl~ENTS 300 
MoTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 207 
PNEUMONIA, INFLUENZA 1q1 
ACCIDENTS IN HOME 95 
SUICIDE 95 
DIABETES 95 
BEING HUR.DERED (HOHICJDE) 90 
DROWNING lfl 
JOB WITH RADIATION EXPOSURE lfO 
FALLS 39 
NATURAL RADIATION {BEIR) 8 
MEDICAL X-RAYS 6 
COFFEE ~ 
Au CATASTROPHES COMBINED 3.5 
REACTOR ACCIDENTS Cues) 2A 
RAl>JATION FROM NUCLEAR INDUSTRY Q,Q2A 
ATHESE JTEHS ASSUME THAT ALL u'."s. POWER IS NUCLEAR, UCS IS UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE MOST PROMINENT GROUP OF CRITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, 
SOURCE: I, COHEN AND L.EE1 1979, 
Table 3 
R1su ESTIMATED TO IIICREAH CIWfCE o, DEATH Ill Alff YEAR IY 0.000001 Cl PART Ill l l'IILLIOld 
AcT!VITY 
Sl'IOKIII& 1,1! Cl&AIIETTtS 
SPENDING l HOUR Ill A COAi. l'IINE 
LIVING 2 DAYS Ill N£W YORK OR BosTOII 
TR.AvtLINS 10 IOU.S BY JIICYCU! 
M..YlNG 1,000 l'IIU.S BY JET 
LIVING 2 IOITIIS IN l!ENYER ON VACATION FROII NEW YORK 
ONE CHEST X-RAY TAUN IN A GOOD HOSPITAL 
UTING 110 TAIILESPOOII$ OF l'EAIIIIT BUTTER 
DRINKING 30 12-oz. CANS ?F DIET SODA 
DRINKING 1,000 21!-oz. SOFT DRINKS FR011 RECENTLY 
- . JIANNED Pl.AST! C aonu. s 
LIVING 150 YEARS WITHIN 20 l'IILES OF A NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT 
RISK.OF ACCIDENT BY LIVING WITHIN 5 MILES OF,. 
NUCLEAR REACTOR FOR 50 YEARS 
SouRC:E: l lflLSOII, 1979, 
C.Wsr OF l>£A Tk 
CANCER, H!AIIT DISEASE 
BL.ACK LUNG DISUSE 
Al R POL.UIT I OIi 
AcclDENT 
AcCIDENT 
CANCER CAUSED BY COSMIC RADIATION 
CANCER CAUSED BY RADIATION 
L1vu CANCER CAUSED IY AFL.ATOXIN 8 
CANCER CAUSED BY SACCHARIN 
CANCER FROII ACRYLONITRILE l"ONOKER 
CANCER CAUSED BY RADIATION 
CANCER CAUSED av RADIATION 
Table 4. Characteristics Examined in Psychometric Studies of Perceived 
Risk. 
I Voluntary - Involuntary 
t Chronic - Catastrophic 
• Common - Dread 
8 Injurious - Fatal 
O Known to those exposed - Not known to those exposed 
t Known to science - Not known to science 
t Controllable - Not controllable 
8 Old - New 
Table 5 
Questions to Ask of Risk Analyses 
Reporters should consider the following questions whenever a risk 
analysis is produced for use in policy decisions: 
(1) Does the risk analysis state the probability of the 
potential harm as well as the aoount of harm expected? 
(2) Does the risk analysis disclose forthrightly the points at 
which it is based on assumptions and guesswork? 
(3) A:re various risk factors allowed to assume a variety of values 
depending on uncertainties in the data and/or various interpre-
tations of the data? 
(4) Does the risk analysis multiply its probabilities by the number 
of people exposed to produce the number of people predicted to 
suffer damage? 
(5) Does the risk analysis disclose ther confidence limits for its 
projections and the method of arriving at those confidence 
limits? 
(6) A:re considerations of individual sensitivities, exposure to 
multiple ha?.ards and cumulative effects included in the risk 
analysis? 
(7) Are all data and processes of the risk analysis open to public 
scrutiny? 
(8) A:re questions of (a) involuntary exposure, (b) who bears the 
risks and who reaps the benefits and (c) alternatives to the 
ha?.ardous activity considered in the risk analysis? 
(9) Are the processes of risk analysis and risk policy separate? 
If the answer to any of these questions is "no," then the use of 
that risk analysis should be questioned. 
Source: Adapted from Fischhoff, (1985a). 
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